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Abstract 
Most income studies do not take into account the implicit rent obtained by households who 
inhabit their own dwellings, a fact that introduces a potentially relevant bias in inequality, 
poverty, and welfare measures. In this paper we estimate these implicit rents for the Greater 
Buenos Aires area from information of Argentina’s National Household Expenditures 
Survey (ENGH) of 1996/7. Based on a sample of households that rent their dwellings, 
quantile regressions are used to estimate observed rents from a hedonic model. Estimated 
coefficients are applied to households that do not rent their houses or apartments in order to 
predict the implicit rent derived from living in an owned house. Estimated implicit rents are 
added to the standard notion of household income and various inequality measures are re-
estimated. We find that the consideration of these implicit rents reduces inequality due to an 
income elasticity of spending in housing less than one, and to the relatively large proportion 
of house owners in the lower strata of the income distribution.   
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1.  Introduction 
 
The concept of income refers to the flow of resources obtained as remuneration to the 
use of all the assets owned by an individual or household. According to this definition, 
income should include not only the returns for the use of labor and capital, but also any 
other rents produced by the possession of durable goods, such as houses or cars. 
Families living in their own dwellings implicitly receive a flow of income equivalent to 
the market value of the service that the use of this property represents for them. This 
remuneration should be computed as part of household income, even though it is never 
recorded in a formal market and it is not usually registered as income in household 
surveys.  
The main goal of this paper is to estimate the implicit rent received by those 
families that inhabit their own dwellings, and then study the distributional impact of 
adding these rents to the standard notion of income as it is usually reported to household 
surveys. The paper presents a discussion of the alternative estimation procedures and 
the corresponding empirical difficulties found in the implementation of these methods. 
The analysis is based on information for Greater Buenos Aires (GBA) of Argentina’s 
National Household Expenditures Survey (ENGH) for 1996/7. This data set includes 
information on individual income and some characteristics of the dwellings, like 
number of rooms, bathrooms, construction material, availability of water connections, 
heating system, etc. Additionally, we observe the value paid by families that rent their 
houses and apartments.  
The logic used to estimate the implicit rents is simple. Using the sub-sample of 
families that pay a rent, we estimate a hedonic model of rents as a function of 
observable characteristic of the housing. Then, we predict how much a family living in a 
household of their own would pay, conceptually, in terms of an “implicit rent” on the 
basis of observable characteristics. These estimations of the implicit rent are then added 
to the standard reported notion of household income. 
Standard approaches based on mean regression models can be appropriate to 
estimate the average rent for the whole population. Instead, if as it is the case of this 
paper, the goal is to study the distributional effects, standard regression methods can 
lead to inaccurate estimations. This paper uses quantile-regression methods where a 
hedonic equation is estimated for each quantile of the conditional distribution of rents.  
The analysis is completed with a comparison between the original income 
distribution and the resulting one corrected by imputing these implicit rents. In the 
following section we discuss with more detail the problems caused by ignoring the rents 
derived from living in an owned house or apartment, and the methodology we follow to 
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approach this problem. In Section 3 we discuss the estimation and inference strategies. 
Section 4 describes the sample, presents the results, and evaluates the quality of the 
estimated models. An assessment of the impact of including implicit rents on the 
income distribution is presented in Section 5. Section 6 concludes with some final 
comments.   
 
2. The problem 
 
In this section we present a very simple model to highlight the importance of adjusting 
the standard notion of income by the implicit rents of living in an owned dwelling. Let 
us assume an economy composed by individuals indexed with i. At the beginning of 
their active life these agents inherit Hi and decide whether to purchase a house. The 
budget constraint is  
 
(1)                                                  0)()1( iiiii sqpcH =−− α  
 
where ci is a binary variable that takes value 1 if the individual i buys the house and 0 
otherwise, αi∈[0,1] is the proportion of the house price financed with a loan, qi is a 
vector of characteristics of the house, p(qi) is a function that indicates the market price of 
the house, and si0 is the amount saved or borrow by the individual.  
 During her active life the individual earns income Yi, consumes xi, pays a rent 
A(qi) in case of not having bought a house in the previous period, and repays the loan in 
case of having bought the house with a loan. Assuming a unique market interest rate r, 
the relevant budget constraint is: 
 
(2)                           10 )1)(()()1()1( iiiiiiiii srqpcqAcxrsY +++−+=++ α  
 
Finally, person i retires and leaves her savings (or debts) and what is obtained 
from selling the house as inheritance to the next generation (Ri). With a stable price 
function and no depreciations, the new budget constraint is written as, 
 
(3)                                                      s c p q Ri i i i1 + =( )  
 
Combining (1), (2) and (3) the following budget constraint can be obtained: 
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If the individual chooses to buy the house with her own resources (ci=1, αi=0), the 
relevant budget constraint becomes 
 
(5)                                           Y H r rp q x Ri i i i i+ + − = +( ) ( )1       
 
If she decides to buy the house with a loan (ci=1, αi>0), under our assumptions the 
budget constraint turns out to be equal to (5), while if she rents the house (ci=0), it 
becomes 
 
(6)                                           iiiii RqAxrHY ++=++ )()1(   
 
If the housing market is competitive, prices will adjust for equation (7) to hold.   
 
(7)                                                  
r
qA
qp ii
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)( =   
This equation implies indifference for similar individuals between buying or 
renting a house, since if (7) holds, equations (5) and (6) become equivalent. Living 
standards of similar individuals are identical, regardless of the decision of buying or 
renting a house, and regardless of the decision of buying it with own funds or with a 
loan.  
In practice, studies based on household surveys estimate an individual’s living 
standard by her household current income or expenditures adjusted by family structure. 
In this simplified example, the survey would register as current income Yi + r.(Hi - p(qi)) 
for those owners who bought the house with own resources, and Yi + rHi for tenants. 
Clearly, this standard practice underestimates the income of house owners, introducing 
a bias in the measurement of welfare and inequality.1  
An alternative to alleviate this problem is adding to the owner’s income an 
estimate of the interest payments lost as a consequence of having bought the house. 
From equation (7) this value is equal to the savings that arise from not having rented a 
house similar to the one she owns. 
If the house was bought with a loan, some possibilities arise. If there is a unique 
interest rate r, and in the surveys people report Yi-αi.r.p(qi)+r.(Hi –(1-αi) p(qi)) = Yi + 
                                                 
1 A similar phenomenon occurs when approximating living standard using expenditures, since surveys 
 5
r.(Hi - p(qi)) as current income, then adjusting income for the implicit rent of own-
housing alleviates the problem. However, some people may report gross income, 
ignoring the term αi.r.p(qi). In that case, adding the implicit rent would overestimate 
income. Even when people report net income, if interest rates for loans and deposits 
differ, adding estimates of the implicit rent from own-housing would not completely 
solve the problem of comparability among incomes. Finally, if in contrast to the 
simplified model presented above the individual repays the loan in several periods, the 
fact that she has pending payments implies under most institutional settings that she is 
the owner of only a fraction of the dwelling.    
The approach outlined in this section relies on the assumption that the rental 
housing market is competitive. Although perfect competition is rarely attainable, in 
many cases it seems to be a reasonable approximation to housing markets. For instance, 
in Greater Buenos Aires the housing market is characterized by multiple suppliers and 
low government intervention. Social housing is not widespread in Argentina. A Living 
Standard Measurement Survey conducted in 1997 (Encuesta de Desarrollo Social) 
reveals that only 0.5% of the households in the Greater Buenos Aires live in subsidized 
social housing, while 5% obtain credit from a public institution to build a house. 
Presumably, only a small fraction of this 5% gets loans at subsidized interest rates. 
Additionally, although rent controls were common in other decades, at the beginning of 
the 1990s the housing market was deregulated, and subsidies to tenants and rent 
controls eliminated.  
 
3. Estimation strategy 
 
We have argued for the need to modify the owners’ incomes by adding the implicit rent 
from their dwellings. A basic problem is that these rents are not directly observable and, 
hence, must be estimated. The choice of an appropriate method eventually depends on 
the level of aggregation desired and on data availability. There are several antecedents 
in the literature that are relevant for this work. Katz (1983) reviews alternative methods 
to value consumer durable goods and their rents. The problem of assessing the 
aggregate value of implicit rents of owner-occupied dwellings can be approached from a 
‘national accounts’ perspective, where  aggregate rental values of ownership are 
computed based on national accounts data. Yates (1994) is a relevant reference since it 
discusses several strategies to compute rents based on the national accounts approach. 
In order to study distributional issues it is necessary to impute rents at the individual 
                                                                                                                                               
usually report xi as current expenditures for owners and xi+A(qi) for tenants. 
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level. To this purpose, Yates (1994) proposes to apply average rates estimated from the 
national accounts to individual level of dwelling value. These rents may obey either a 
market value criterion, where rates are computed based on observed market rental rates, 
or an opportunity cost one, where rates are computed based on the return to alternative 
investments to owning a house or apartment.  
Alternatively, as hinted by Malpezzi (2000), we will follow a micro-data 
approach based on the fact that the available survey provides two relevant pieces of 
information: housing characteristics for every household in the sample, and the rents 
paid by tenants. This information allows us to estimate equations that relate housing 
characteristics to the rents paid, and then to impute the estimated parameters to the 
housing characteristics inhabited by owners.2   
Technically, the estimation exercise corresponds to the family of hedonic price 
models: housing is seen as a compound good that results to be the aggregate of a group 
of characteristics (number of rooms, location, availability of garden, etc.), and its price 
is the aggregate value of these characteristics (Rosen, 1974). The estimation of hedonic 
functions is likely to be one of the most thoroughly researched topics in applied 
econometrics, since it faces the analyst with a variety of textbook difficulties including 
model selection, choice of functional form, potential heteroscedasticity, measurement 
errors, etc. A complete review of these topics far exceeds the goals of this paper. The 
study of the hedonic price functions dates back to the pioneer work of Waugh (1929), 
who characterizes the quality of a product as function of its attributes and estimates the 
implicit price of each characteristic. However, the term “hedonic” has not been used 
until the work of Court (1939) and was popularized among economists by Griliches 
(1961). The eighties and nineties have witnessed an enormous amount of empirical 
work that estimates hedonic models with two main purposes: to infer the implicit prices 
of the attributes of a house, and to predict its value. Estimations have followed both 
parametric (see Cropper, Deck and McConell (1988), Craig, Kohlase and Pappel 
(1991), and Laakso (1997)) and non-parametric approaches (Pace, 1995). The survey by 
Sheppard (1999) focuses on different econometric problems that face hedonic 
estimations and some directions to overcome them. Restrictions are often related to data 
availability. For example, although the theoretical literature on urban economics 
                                                 
2 The methodology requires all houses to be either rented or owned by its occupiers. However, it could be 
the case that some non-owners do not pay rents. If this behavior is widespread and not uniformly 
distributed in the population (e.g. more usual for the poor), then a bias in the estimations could arise. 
Although we do not deny this possibility, in practice for the Greater Buenos Aires it does not seem to be 
very relevant. From the survey EDS 1997 the fraction of people who are either renters or owners is more 
than 97%. The rest comprises from poor people who occupy lots in slums to rich managers or government 
officials who get expensive houses from their jobs while in office. 
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suggests including location as an explanatory variable, in many empirical papers this 
variable is not available.  
A conclusion that emerges from this literature is that the choice of an appropriate 
econometric strategy strongly depends on the intended purpose of the analysis. As 
stressed by Sheppard (1999, pp. 1614) hedonic models are used with two main 
purposes. The most popular and more challenging one is to recover the implicit 
(hedonic) prices of attributes, and the second one is to forecast the value of properties. It 
is crucial to remark that for the purposes of this paper it is the second use of hedonic 
models that guides the choice of a relevant framework. In general terms such models 
estimate a simple function of the log of prices (rents paid) as a function of a variety of 
explanatory variables related to different observable housing characteristics.  
The standard approach estimates mean regression models, which have serious 
limitations to study distributional effects. In particular, as it will be shown in the 
empirical section, the standard method predicts relatively high rents for poor households 
and relatively low rents for the rich ones. As an example, consider the case of poor 
households. Given that most of the explanatory variables of the hedonic model are 
binary variables indicating whether the house or apartment has a certain characteristic 
(electric doorbell, swimming pool, garage, etc.) or variables with larger values for 
“better” characteristics (number of rooms, bathrooms, etc.), for the very low income 
households these indicators are zero or close to zero, for which the prediction of the rent 
is, essentially, the intercept of the hedonic function. In the standard interpretation, the 
intercept of a linear model is the average of the market value of these non-observable 
characteristics of the housing. In fact, if none of the characteristics were observed, the 
intercept will be the average rent paid by all the individuals in the sample. Then, the 
prediction of a standard regression model would assign to all households the same 
average value of these non-observable characteristics, spuriously inflating the value of 
the housing inhabited by the poorest households, and underestimating the value of the 
housing for high-income families.   
In order to overcome this problem we use quantile regression methods, where a 
hedonic equation is estimated for each quantile of the conditional income distribution. 
Koenker and Hallock (2001) is a recent and elementary introduction to these methods. 
The implicit assumption is that the monetary value of the demand for non-observable 
characteristics is related monotonically to the distribution of income, so that conditional 
quantiles of the distribution of non-observables coincides with the quantiles of the 
distribution of income, that is, individuals in the first decile of the distribution of 
income are assigned as their demand for non-observables the first decile of the 
conditional distribution of non-observables, and so on. Though restrictive, this 
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assumption help us distribute non-observables in a less drastic way, since poorer 
households will be assigned a relatively lower value of the non-observables.  
Formally, the model to be estimated has the following form: 
 
Q(A|τ) = qβτ + Q(u|τ)  
 
where Q(A| τ) is the τ-th quantile of the conditional distribution of rents (A), q is a vector 
of observable housing characteristics, including a constant, βτ is a vector of coefficients 
that indicates how observable characteristics affect the τ-th quantile of the conditional 
distribution of A, and u is an error term that contains the market values of all non-
observable characteristics of the paid rents. It is important to note that such specification 
permits that explanatory variables affect in different ways the conditional quantile of the 
explained variable. In particular, each quantile has its own intercept. In the basic 
regression quantile model initially proposed by Koenker and Bassett (1978) the 
coefficients can be consistently estimated as a solution to the following linear program:  
 
∑
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where I( ) is an indicator function. With the purpose of testing hypothesis and 
constructing confidence intervals, let )ˆ,,ˆ(ˆ
1 mn ττ βββ K≡  be a km vector of k coefficients 
estimated for m different quantiles based on a sample of n observations, and let βo be its 
population counterpart. Under some regularity conditions (Koenker and Bassett, 1978) 
it can be verified that: 
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where Ω is a m x m matrix with typical element: 
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Q0 = limn →∝ n-1(Q’Q), “⊗” is the Kronecker product, and “⇒” denotes convergence in 
distribution. For practical purposes it is necessary to estimate the parameters f(F-1(τ)) 
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using standard non-parametric density estimation techniques. This result can be easily 
used to build confidence intervals.  
Model building in hedonic analysis is a complicated issue. A first problem is the 
choice of a relevant set of explanatory variables used to predict rents. As it is the case of 
compound commodities which are the subject of hedonic analysis, rents are treated as a 
“price” paid for the use of all the characteristics (observed or not) embodied in the 
dwelling. Consequently, theory places few restrictions regarding which variables to 
include or exclude from the analysis since all observed characteristics are implicitly 
valued by consumers. From an empirical point of view, as it is well known, the price to 
be paid for incorrect variable exclusion is in terms of potential biases, and the benefits 
are related to reductions in the dimension of the parameter space which might 
eventually translate into efficiency gains. The strategy of avoiding possibly non-realistic 
theory restrictions points toward including as many variables as they are available, 
which for a given sample size, may induce high multicollinearity among the regressors. 
This might seriously affect the precision of estimated hedonic prices due to the well 
established fact that high multicollinearity affects the identification of the true hedonic 
coefficients. But if, as it is the case of this paper, the goal is to predict prices from a 
given set of explanatory variables, high multicollinearity is also well known to not 
affect the forecast performance of standard OLS estimation (Judge, et al., 1995, pp. 897 
and 901). Hence, for the purposes of this paper high multicollinearity or proper variable 
selection is not a serious problem.  
Alternatively, the quantile methods used in this paper require to keep the 
dimension of the problem at a relatively low level. An arbitrary high number of 
regressors seriously affect the computational performance of the algorithms used to 
produce estimations, besides affecting the precision of estimates as in the case of OLS 
methods. Hence, in order to keep the dimension of the problem as low as possible 
without harming the predictive performance of the model, the estimation strategy used 
is the following. In a first exploratory stage a simple regression model is estimated for 
rented houses and apartments, incorporating all the explanatory variables. Considering 
that these variables are proxies for economic factors not directly observable, and with 
the aim of obtaining a simplified representation, a stepwise search method was used. 
The search was implemented “forwards” (beginning with a model without explanatory 
variables, adding them according to its statistical significance measured by their ‘t’-
statistics) and “backwards” (beginning with all the explanatory variables and 
eliminating them one-by-one according to the same criterion). The use of a search 
algorithm is arbitrary, but no less than other commonly used strategies like plain 
variable deletion or the use of principal component regression (Judge et al., pp. 909). 
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For the predictive goals of this paper, the nesting structure of the original and final 
model implies that the ultimate validity check is that the low-dimensional model 
adopted does not imply a significant loss in predictive power compared to the high-
dimensional original model. To this purpose we compare standard goodness-of-fit 
criteria to assess the loss in explanatory power between the original model and the 
chosen one.  
In a second stage the simplified versions of the models are estimated using 
quantile regression methods. Surely this strategy is subject to some caveats. In 
particular, there is no guarantee that the model chosen by OLS methods would coincide 
with the one chosen by a similar strategy implemented base on quantile regressions. The 
main reason to proceed to use OLS in the exploratory stage is, precisely, to reduce the 
dimension of the problem so as to avoid the computational disadvantages of a high 
dimensional parameter space in quantile regression, which would make it impossible to 
carry out the search procedure. Fortunately, as will be discussed in the next section, the 
slope coefficients estimated by OLS and regression quantiles at different quantiles do 
not differ significantly, which suggests that both methods agree with the selected model. 
The choice of the log functional form is based mostly to be in accordance with a 
substantial part of the previous literature. This is a relevant topic that might affect the 
estimation of hedonic prices (but not necessarily the prediction of aggregate prices), as 
documented by Cropper, Deck and McConell (1988). A full assessment of these biases 
in the quantile regression framework is an interesting topic for further research. 
 
4.  Estimation of hedonic rent models  
 
The sample 
 
We use data from the Argentina’s National Household Expenditures Survey (ENGH) 
conducted between February 1996 and March 1997.3 We work with a sub-sample 
corresponding to the metropolitan area of Greater Buenos Aires (GBA).4 The survey 
includes information on household expenditures and incomes, and on different 
demographic, occupational and educational characteristics of the population. An 
important subset of variables is related to dwelling characteristics. In the estimation 
stage we use a sub-sample of households that report living in rented houses or 
                                                 
3 The ENGH is the only survey in Argentina with information on household incomes, rents and housing 
characteristics. The other available surveys (EPH, EDS and ECV) do not report rents paid by tenants.  
4 The Greater Buenos Aires comprises the city of Buenos Aires and its suburbs (around 2,600 km2). It is 
an area inhabited by 12 million people, living in around 3 million residences.  
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apartments for which we observe a positive rent. This sub-sample includes 544 
households -201 houses and 343 apartments- out of the 4112 households in the whole 
survey for GBA.  
We estimate different models for houses and apartments, which allow 
explanatory variables to have differential effects according to the type of housing. Table 
1 presents means and standard deviations of the variables used in the analysis. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE] 
 
Three variables usually identified as potential determinants of the price of a 
house are not reported in the ENGH:  size,  age and location. The first variable can be 
approximated by the number of rooms and bathrooms, and the presence of a garage, 
kitchen and garden. However, it is difficult to estimate the age of the house or its 
location with the variables shown in Table 1.5   
 
OLS estimations: initial and simplified models  
 
Having divided the sample in houses and apartments, we proceeded with the estimation 
of a simple model of rents paid as a function of observable characteristics of the 
dwelling. The variable of interest (rent) takes values between 50 and 5000 pesos per 
month. As it is standard we have worked with the natural logarithm of rents (lrent) as 
the dependent variable. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 2 HERE] 
 
OLS estimations of the initial and simplified hedonic model for houses are 
shown in Table 2. The first two columns present results for houses. The F-tests suggest 
that the explanatory variables are significant to explain the logarithm of rents. In the 
initial model the R2 indicates that the linear model explains approximately 50% of the 
variability of the log of paid rents, which is reasonably high for micro data. With a 
relatively conservative level of significance (10%), both search methods (backwards 
and forwards) select exactly the same model based on the same sub-group of 
explanatory variables.  
These results suggest that a simple model of rents can be based on seven 
observable characteristics: number of rooms, telephone, running water, security, 
parking, hot water in the kitchen and electric doorbell. This simplified model is 
                                                 
5 The availability of a garden may be a proxy for distance from the city center.  
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significantly more parsimonious than the original one that includes 22 explanatory 
variables. Formally, an F-test of linear restrictions indicates accepting the null 
hypothesis implicit in the simplification. The loss of explanatory power is, 
consequently, of very little significance. The R2 of the simplified model is 0.47, while 
that of the original one is 0.50. This effect is better captured by the adjusted R2. In fact, 
the adjusted R2 of the simplified model (0.45) is slightly higher than the one 
corresponding to the original one (0.44).  
Although for this paper the main objective of the estimation is predicting rents, it 
is useful to discuss some particular results of the simplified model. All the estimated 
coefficients have the expected signs. An additional bedroom increases the value of the 
rent 17%. Surprisingly, other size variables turn out to be non-significant, such as the 
number of bathrooms. Telephone, water, hot water in the kitchen, and electric doorbell 
can be interpreted as indicators of the quality of the housing. It is interesting to observe 
that these characteristics increase the value of the rent in approximately the same 
magnitude. This fact suggests that, at least in terms of the determination of the value of 
the rent, an elementary index of quality of the housing can be built as the aggregation of 
these characteristics. Consequently, according to the obtained results, the marginal 
contribution of any of the mentioned characteristics in the value of the rent is always the 
same. The value of the coefficient of the private security variable is, although not 
precisely estimated, significantly high. Taking into account the low proportion of 
observations with this indicator equal to 1, it is possible that this variable identifies 
dwellings of very high quality. Finally, the availability of a garage increases the value 
of the rent 14%. This variable has a less clear interpretation, since, as we have 
previously remarked, a garage can be interpreted as an indicator of both the size and the 
quality of the house.   
The last two columns of Table 2 present similar results for apartments. As in the 
previous case, the F-test suggests that explanatory variables are, as a group, significant 
to explain rents. The R2 coefficient indicates that the linear model explains 
approximately 40% of the variability in the dependent variable. The problem of high 
correlation between explanatory variables seems to be relevant in this case, and 
complicates the identification of the parameters and, consequently, the selection of a 
relevant simplification. Unlike the case of houses, different stepwise procedures lead to 
different specifications. Keeping in mind that the presence of near multicolineality does 
not affect the predictive ability of the model, and the fact that the R2 is slightly higher 
than in the case of the downwards specification, the backwards model was selected as 
an acceptable simplification. Again, the loss in explanatory power is not significant with 
respect to the complete model. This indicates that, compensated by the gain in degrees-
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of-freedom, the explanatory power of both models is virtually indistinguishable. 
Besides, the correlation structure of the variables maintained in the simplified model 
does not show values greater than 0.37, which suggests that the problem of near 
multicolineality in the original estimation does not exist in the simplified version.  
Regarding the interpretation of the coefficients, the one corresponding to the 
number of bedrooms is very similar to the one obtained in the model for houses. From 
this fact it could be concluded that the contribution of an additional bedroom increases 
the value of the rent in approximately 17%, independently of whether it is a house or an 
apartment. The rest of the variables have the expected signs. Factors that significantly 
and positively contribute to the rent are the number of bathrooms, a heating system, and 
having access to the natural gas and sewerage network. Apartments located in a 
complex have lower expected rent values, while apartments in higher floors are on 
average more expensive.   
 
Estimations based on quantile regressions  
 
In terms of explanatory and predictive power, the R2 of the estimated models indicate 
that the variables incorporated as regressors explain 40 to 50% of the total variability of 
the (log) rents. This suggests that the mechanism through which rents are determined 
has idiosyncratic, non-observable components that cannot be properly addressed by the 
large number of explanatory variables incorporated in the model. As it has been 
advanced in Section 2, the intercept of the linear regression model estimates the average 
of the market valuation of these unobserved heterogeneities, which seem to have a non-
trivial role in the determination of rents.  
Table 3 presents estimates of the quantile regression model for houses and 
apartments for quantiles 0.1, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75 and 0.9 of the conditional distribution of 
rents. Figure 1 summarizes the estimated coefficients. Each graph presents estimations 
of the coefficients of a variable for different quantiles. The dotted line corresponds to 
point estimates, and the solid lines to the 95% confidence intervals, using the methods 
described in the previous section.  
[INSERT TABLE 3 HERE] 
 
[INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE] 
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5. Imputed rent and income distribution 
 
After estimating rent models for houses and apartments, we computed the predicted 
implicit rent values associated to housing ownership. In this section we discuss the 
results of these imputations and their impact on the measurement of income inequality. 
Table 4 groups families by deciles according to their household per capita 
income prior to the adjustment by implicit rents. Column (i) reports the percentage of 
owners in each decile. Home ownership is very widespread in Greater Buenos Aires: 
more than 85% of the households inhabit in their own houses or apartments. It is 
interesting to note that owning a house or apartment is more common among low-
income people, which suggests that, ceteris paribus, adjusting incomes by implicit rents 
would generate a fall in inequality measures.  
 
[INSERT TABLE 4 HERE] 
 
Columns (ii) to (vi) refer to the group of owners. Column (ii) presents the 
average total household income for each decile, while column (iii) shows the average 
imputed rents estimated by OLS. The average rent for the lowest income decile is $241 
while for the top decile this value is $542. The estimated imputed rent as a proportion of 
total family income is strictly decreasing in income (62% for the poorest decile and 
16% for richest one). This result is consistent with an income elasticity of housing 
expenses less than unity, which, again, suggests that the adjustment of incomes by 
implicit rents would induce an equalizing effect on the income distribution. This result 
is in line with what previous research has found in local markets (see Malpezzi, 2000 
and Malpezzi and Mayo, 1987).  
The results in columns (iii) and (v) must be cautiously interpreted, keeping in 
mind the following considerations. First, the estimated value of the implicit rent as a 
proportion of income might seem to be too high. However, it should be taken into 
account that in most surveys incomes are more under reported than some expenditure 
items, like housing rents, for which the figures in column (v) (based on incomes 
reported to the survey) are probably higher than the actual ones. Gasparini (1998) 
estimates a level of under report in the ENGH which on average implies multiplying 
reported incomes by a factor of 2.5. Naturally, this adjustment would imply a large fall 
in the share of implicit rents with regard to the results of column (v) in Table 4.   
Second, the model estimated to predict rents is based on limited information, 
since it is not possible to obtain data on some important rents determinants, like the 
location of the house or the exact size of the dwelling. The estimated model tends to 
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capture the influence of these characteristics in an indirect way through variables related 
to these non-observable factors in the sample. This implies a greater variance since the 
error term incorporates factors that are not directly observed which, as it has been 
discussed in the previous section, reduces the predictive ability of the model. This 
suggests that, given the limitations of the sample information, it would be cautious to 
assign these estimations a certain rank of variability caused by the impossibility of 
measuring all the relevant effects in the rent determination. However, it is important to 
note that the goodness-of-fit measures obtained in the estimation are not significantly 
lower than the ones obtained in similar studies for the local market (Figueroa and Lever 
(1992), Stumpf Gonzalez and Torres Formoso (1997) and Gomez Mera (1998)), even 
though these studies are based on a larger set of rent determinants obtained directly 
from the real estate market.  
Third, it is interesting to consider to what extent housing characteristics differ 
between rented and non-rented dwellings. In Table 5 we present a summary of the main 
housing characteristics for owner and tenant households for both apartments and 
houses, and a formal test for the null of no differences in their means.6 In general, even 
when owner occupied houses and apartments are on average larger than rented ones, 
there is considerable overlap between the distributions of the characteristics of both 
samples.  
 
[INSERT TABLE 5 HERE] 
 
Additionally, it is interesting to compare the predicted imputed rents with the 
rents paid. While the average imputed rent is $379, the average rent reported in the 
survey is $365. According to columns (iii) and (viii) of Table 4, differences by deciles 
are not substantial.  
These considerations suggest that the seemingly high values of the predicted 
implicit rent are mostly due to the income under-report phenomenon previously 
described, and not to the structural deficiencies of the model used for prediction or to 
differences in the characteristics between the households used for the estimation and 
those used for the prediction.  
Table 6 presents intercepts of the conditional distribution of rents by per capita 
household income deciles. As mentioned in Section 3, instead of assigning a single 
intercept for every household (the one estimated by OLS), we use for each household 
the intercept corresponding to its relative position in the conditional distribution of 
                                                 
6 Standard tests for differences in means were computed for count variables (rooms, bathrooms, etc.) and 
differences in proportions for binary indicators. 
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rents, under the assumption that the deciles of  both distributions can be matched, that 
is, for households in the first decile we assign an intercept corresponding to the first 
decile in the conditional distribution of rents, and so on. For houses, the intercept is 
$101.6 for decile 1, and $240 for decile 10. This should be compared with the OLS 
intercept, $136.4. This implies that the adjustment in the intercept is more important for 
high-income families. In the case of apartments exactly the opposite occurs. The 
predicted intercept for the lower decile is $30.8 while the initial method predicted $77.3. 
This implies a correction of approximately 60%.   
 
[INSERT TABLE 6 HERE] 
 
The implicit rents estimated with this correction are presented in column (iv) of 
Table 4. As it was expected, the correction of the intercept reduces the estimation of the 
rents for the lower deciles (from 1 to 4) and increases it in the top deciles. For example, 
the original method predicted a rent that resulted to be 62% of the total family income 
computed in the survey while the corrected method predicts 53%.   
 
Adjustment by implicit rents and income inequality 
 
The last goal of this paper is to assess the impact on the Greater Buenos Aires’ income 
distribution of adding the estimated implicit rents from owning a house or apartment.7 
Graph 2 presents non-parametric kernel-based estimations of the original income 
distribution, and the resulting one after adding implicit rents using quantile-based 
estimations. Table 7 presents various inequality indexes computed on nine different 
distributions. In the first column we show inequality measures for the per capita 
household income distribution computed with the original data from the ENGH. In the 
following four columns we add to that distribution the estimations of implicit rent. 
Columns (ii) and (iii) are based on OLS estimates while in the next two columns 
quantile regression estimations are shown. 
 
[INSERT GRAPH 2 HERE] 
 
As discussed in section 2 a problem arises if some people bought their houses 
with loans and have pending payments. From the ENGH the proportion of owners 
                                                 
7 Inequality has been significantly increasing in Argentina (and in the Greater Buenos Aires) for the last 
three decades. Once a low-inequality economy compared to the rest of Latin America, Argentina is now 
reaching inequality levels close to the Latin American mean (Gasparini, 2003). 
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having pending payments is 7%.8 We do not have information on the share of the loan 
already paid by each family. For this reason we take two extreme alternatives. In the 
even columns we ignore the fact that some families have bought their houses with 
credits. These families are treated as owners and are assigned rents derived from 
housing ownership. On the other hand, in the odd columns, rents are not imputed to 
families that report having pending payments for their houses.9  
Columns (vi) to (ix) reproduce these exercises multiplying the per capita 
household income from the ENGH by a factor of 2.5, in order to adjust for under-
reporting in the survey.   
 
[INSERT TABLE 7 HERE] 
 
The Gini coefficient of the original household per capita income is 0.445. As a 
result of adding the estimated implicit rents (using OLS) to the owners the Gini 
coefficient falls to 0.410. As it is expected, this drop is smaller if the quantile-based 
estimations are used, if we do not impute rents to credit holders and, in particular, if the 
adjustment for under-reporting is made. Taking into account these considerations, the 
Gini coefficient still falls but the change is smaller: from 0.445 to 0.432. The rest of the 
inequality indicators behave in a similar fashion.  
The fall in the inequality indicators is driven by two facts. First, in Greater 
Buenos Aires home ownership is somewhat more widespread in low-income strata, 
which implies that an implicit rent imputation proportional to income would imply an 
equalizing effect on the income distribution. Second, the imputations turn out to be non-
proportional to income, reflecting an income-elasticity of housing expenses smaller than 
one, which adds a second equalizing effect on the income distribution.   
 
6. Final comments 
This paper presents estimations of the implicit rents from own housing based on 
microdata from the National Household Expenditures Survey of Greater Buenos Aires. 
The paper discusses the different methodological and empirical difficulties related to the 
estimation process, which should necessarily be considered to evaluate empirical 
results. The estimates of implicit rents are added to household income and inequality 
indexes are computed over the resulting distribution. Recorded inequality decreases as 
                                                 
8 The pattern by household income is not clear. The share of households with pending payments by 
quintiles is 6.4%, 7.6%, 6.3%, 5.6% and 8.5%. 
9 Naturally, a bias could arise if the relative size of the pending payment differs by income strata.  
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implicit rents are included due to widespread housing ownership along the income 
distribution, and an income-elasticity of housing expenses smaller than one 
There exist several dimensions in which this investigation can be extended.  
Obviously, information availability, like housing location and other variables absent in 
the ENGH, should contribute to improve the quality of the estimations. Also, as 
mentioned in section 3, it is important to confront the results of this work to alternative 
estimation strategies. In particular, it would be relevant to aggregate the micro-level 
estimates obtained by this work and then compare results with rents estimated using the 
national accounts approach, as discussed in Yates (1994). Though it is methodologically 
complex to harmonize micro information with aggregate data, this is an important 
validation exercise that should be implemented.  
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Table 1: Variables name and description  
                             Houses                                Apartments
Description Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Rent rent 373.04           459.47              371.95              0.36                  
Number of bathrooms bathrooms 1.10               0.70                  1.28                  0.71                  
Number of bedrooms bedrooms 2.75               0.90                  2.29                  0.91                  
Construction material (categorical) material 2.62               0.72                  2.95                  0.26                  
Running water (1=yes, 0=no) water 0.75               0.44                  0.97                  0.18                  
Hot water in the kitchen (1=yes, 0=no) hot water 0.61               0.49                  0.87                  0.34                  
Air conditioner (1=yes, 0=no) AC 0.05               0.22                  0.08                  0.28                  
Bathroom of exclusive use (1=yes, 0=no) exc bath 0.99               0.12                  0.99                  0.12                  
Sewerage system (1=yes, 0=no) sewerage 0.54               0.50                  0.93                  0.26                  
Parking (1=yes, 0=no) parking 0.26               0.44                  0.16                  0.37                  
Kitchen (1=yes, 0=no) kitchen 0.97               0.17                  0.98                  0.14                  
Stove (1=yes, 0=no) stove 0.65               0.48                  0.92                  0.27                  
Belongs to a complex (1=yes, 0=no) complex 0.01               0.11                  0.05                  0.22                  
Type of bathroom (categorical) type bath 0.54               0.50                  0.93                  0.26                  
Distance from public transportation stop transportation 0.93               0.25                  1.00                  0.07                  
Natural gas (1=yes, 0=no) gas 0.84               0.37                  0.96                  0.19                  
Garden (1=yes, 0=no) garden 0.52               0.50                  0.23                  0.42                  
Electric doorbell (1=yes, 0=no) e.doorbell 0.08               0.27                  0.73                  0.45                  
Water source (categorical) water source 0.71               0.45                  0.97                  0.18                  
Security (1=yes, 0=no) security 0.02               0.13                  0.08                  0.28                  
Heating system (1=yes, 0=no) heating 0.44               0.50                  0.64                  0.48                  
Telephone (1=yes, 0=no) phone 0.41               0.49                  0.72                  0.45                  
Public lighting (1=yes, 0=no) lighting 0.95               0.22                  
Elevator (1=yes, 0=no) elevator 0.58                  0.50                  
Floor 2 floor 2 0.15                  0.35                  
Floor 3 floor 3 0.12                  0.33                  
Floor 4 floor 4 0.37                  0.48                  
Floor 5 or more floor 5 0.18                  0.38                  
Doorkeeper (1=yes, 0=no) doorkeeper 0.50                  0.50                   
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the ENGH.  
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Table 2: OLS Estimation  
                               Houses                                    Apartments
Initial model Simplified model Initial model Simplified model
bedrooms 0.1672 0.1711 0.1793 0.1747
(3.8390) (4.1630) (7.5760) (7.5710)
lighting -0.0258
-(0.2420)
water 0.1641 0.2304 0.2380
(1.1260) (3.5740) (1.9710)
sewerage -0.1268 -0.1288
-(1.2470) -(1.1210)
gas 0.0546 -0.1996
(0.5930) -(1.5000)
complex 0.0121 -0.1466 -0.1434
(0.0710) -(1.6800) -(1.7080)
e.doorbell 0.2788 0.2409 0.0058
(2.5770) (2.2160) (0.0950)
security 0.7054 0.7539 -0.0460
(1.7800) (1.6830) -(0.7200)
parking 0.1290 0.1420 0.0476
(1.8760) (2.3170) (1.0510)
transportation -0.1136 0.0193
-(0.9530) (0.2400)
phone 0.1898 0.2031 0.0010
(2.8620) (3.4570) (0.0270)
exc bath 0.1646 0.6730 0.7576
(0.5060) (2.2120) (2.6050)
bathrooms 0.0169 0.0385 0.0408
(0.3830) (1.5360) (1.6530)
kitchen 0.1069 0.1559
(0.3130) (1.1360)
hot water 0.1295 0.2369 0.0630
(1.4590) (3.9170) (0.8650)
AC 0.2096 0.0333
(1.0190) (0.5820)
material 0.0487 -0.0169
(1.2560) -(0.2730)
stove 0.1037 0.2381 0.2502
(0.9950) (2.1270) (3.7500)
type bath 0.1228 0.1664 0.0985
(1.1680) (1.5510) (1.7320)
garden 0.0703 0.0145
(1.2120) (0.4100)
water source 0.0569
(0.4030)
heating -0.0474 0.0674 0.0750
-(0.6470) (2.2900) (2.7460)
constant 4.4532 4.7829 4.0355 4.1035
(11.0330) (40.0890) (10.2650) (13.4020)
floor 2 0.1934 0.1973
(3.3290) (4.1220)
floor 3 0.1149 0.1348
(1.4140) (2.2410)
floor 4 0.2273 0.2661
(1.6670) (5.9270)
floor 5 0.2242 0.2670
(1.5610) (4.7780)
elevator -0.0082
-(0.0650)
doorkeeper 0.0372
(0.7200)
F (22.178) = 7.91 (7.193) = 17.66 (26.316) = 8.88 (11.331) = 14.94
R2 0.5008 0.4739 0.4142 0.4002
n 201 201 343 343  
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the ENGH.  
Note: t-statistics in parenthesis 
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Table 3 a): Quantile regression estimation. Model for houses  
Coefficient Std. Error Conf. Int. Low Conf. Int. Up.
0.1
bedrooms 0.0230 0.0740 -0.1228 0.1688
phone 0.1771 0.1236 -0.0663 0.4206
water 0.2001 0.1244 -0.0450 0.4453
security 0.5826 0.6108 -0.6210 1.7862
parking 0.1771 0.1339 -0.0868 0.4411
hot water 0.4308 0.1863 0.0636 0.7980
e.doorbell 0.2053 0.1385 -0.0676 0.4783
intercept 4.6214 0.2275 4.1731 5.0697
0.25
bedrooms 0.1385 0.0452 0.0495 0.2276
phone 0.1551 0.0733 0.0106 0.2996
water 0.2338 0.0902 0.0561 0.4115
security 0.4868 0.6911 -0.8751 1.8486
parking 0.1657 0.0695 0.0287 0.3028
hot water 0.1551 0.0863 -0.0149 0.3251
e.doorbell 0.1542 0.1581 -0.1575 0.4658
intercept 4.7171 0.1375 4.4461 4.9880
0.5
bedrooms 0.1069 0.0480 0.0123 0.2015
phone 0.2012 0.0771 0.0493 0.3531
water 0.2624 0.0835 0.0977 0.4270
security 2.0103 0.8860 0.2643 3.7562
parking 0.0677 0.0810 -0.0920 0.2273
hot water 0.2296 0.0769 0.0780 0.3812
e.doorbell 0.1178 0.1438 -0.1656 0.4012
intercept 4.9777 0.1401 4.7017 5.2537
0.75
bedrooms 0.0967 0.0359 0.0259 0.1675
phone 0.1800 0.0589 0.0640 0.2961
water 0.1933 0.0672 0.0609 0.3257
security 1.7421 0.7571 0.2502 3.2341
parking 0.0944 0.0653 -0.0342 0.2230
hot water 0.2254 0.0570 0.1131 0.3377
e.doorbell 0.2406 0.1749 -0.1040 0.5852
intercept 5.2315 0.1117 5.0114 5.4516
0.9
bedrooms 0.1542 0.0668 0.0225 0.2858
phone 0.3026 0.1438 0.0192 0.5860
water 0.2364 0.1034 0.0326 0.4402
security 1.5563 0.6248 0.3250 2.7876
parking 0.0531 0.1325 -0.2079 0.3142
hot water 0.1560 0.1180 -0.0766 0.3886
e.doorbell 0.2025 0.2028 -0.1971 0.6022
intercept 5.2395 0.1685 4.9075 5.5715  
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the ENGH.  
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Table 3 b): Quantile regression estimation. Model for apartments  
Coefficient Std. Error Conf. Int. Low Conf. Int. Up.
0.1
bedrooms 0.0558 0.0719 -0.0856 0.1972
bathrooms 0.1691 0.1987 -0.2217 0.5599
heating 0.0000 0.0821 -0.1615 0.1615
exc bath 1.0411 0.4697 0.1173 1.9648
floor 2 0.3152 0.1192 0.0808 0.5496
floor 3 0.0771 0.1473 -0.2127 0.3668
floor 4 0.3152 0.1149 0.0892 0.5412
floor 5 0.1886 0.1425 -0.0916 0.4689
complex -0.1116 0.1398 -0.3866 0.1635
stove 0.4338 0.2176 0.0057 0.8618
type bath 0.2036 0.1335 -0.0591 0.4663
intercept 3.4295 0.4871 2.4714 4.3876
0.25
bedrooms 0.1438 0.0193 0.1059 0.1818
bathrooms 0.2513 0.1026 0.0495 0.4531
heating 0.0103 0.0340 -0.0566 0.0773
exc bath 0.2438 0.5122 -0.7636 1.2511
floor 2 0.1438 0.0613 0.0234 0.2643
floor 3 0.0748 0.0759 -0.0744 0.2241
floor 4 0.2774 0.0629 0.1537 0.4010
floor 5 0.1823 0.0836 0.0180 0.3467
complex -0.2290 0.1097 -0.4447 -0.0133
stove 0.3952 0.1038 0.1910 0.5993
type bath 0.1178 0.0876 -0.0545 0.2900
intercept 4.2642 0.5029 3.2750 5.2535
0.5
bedrooms 0.1587 0.0224 0.1147 0.2028
bathrooms 0.1878 0.0610 0.0678 0.3078
heating 0.0880 0.0293 0.0304 0.1456
exc bath 0.4028 0.3130 -0.2129 1.0185
floor 2 0.1162 0.0499 0.0180 0.2143
floor 3 0.0788 0.0704 -0.0596 0.2172
floor 4 0.2421 0.0432 0.1571 0.3272
floor 5 0.2421 0.0535 0.1369 0.3473
complex -0.1452 0.1278 -0.3966 0.1062
stove 0.2513 0.0994 0.0559 0.4467
type bath 0.0092 0.0809 -0.1500 0.1684
intercept 4.4518 0.3254 3.8118 5.0917
0.75
bedrooms 0.1740 0.0276 0.1197 0.2282
bathrooms 0.1978 0.0796 0.0413 0.3543
heating 0.1137 0.0362 0.0425 0.1850
exc bath 0.2638 0.2486 -0.2251 0.7527
floor 2 0.1445 0.0549 0.0366 0.2524
floor 3 0.1740 0.0566 0.0626 0.2853
floor 4 0.2877 0.0464 0.1963 0.3790
floor 5 0.2719 0.0653 0.1435 0.4004
complex -0.0488 0.1058 -0.2568 0.1592
stove 0.1740 0.0686 0.0390 0.3089
type bath 0.0281 0.0639 -0.0975 0.1537
intercept 4.6922 0.2473 4.2058 5.1786
0.9
bedrooms 0.1823 0.0362 0.1112 0.2535
bathrooms 0.2485 0.0870 0.0773 0.4196
heating 0.1178 0.0596 0.0005 0.2351
exc bath 0.2624 0.2404 -0.2106 0.7353
floor 2 0.1054 0.1040 -0.0992 0.3099
floor 3 0.0974 0.1370 -0.1720 0.3668
floor 4 0.2389 0.0915 0.0590 0.4188
floor 5 0.2781 0.1123 0.0573 0.4990
complex 0.0725 0.1697 -0.2613 0.4063
stove 0.2107 0.0793 0.0548 0.3666
type bath 0.0896 0.0895 -0.0865 0.2657
intercept 4.6821 0.2378 4.2143 5.1499  
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the ENGH.  
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Table 4: Household income, implicit rent and rent paid 
 
                                        Owners      Tenants
       Imputed rent % of household income
Decile % of owners Household 
income
OLS QR OLS QR Household 
income
Rent paid
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) (viii)
1 97% 388.8 241.0 205.5 62% 53% 380.8 202.2
2 92% 543.7 292.5 265.4 54% 49% 764.1 257.8
3 90% 693.7 321.9 301.8 46% 44% 813.2 268.0
4 87% 771.5 345.5 341.5 45% 44% 976.8 295.0
5 88% 937.7 374.2 384.6 40% 41% 1035.0 342.3
6 85% 1142.6 399.6 423.8 35% 37% 1194.7 328.9
7 86% 1222.7 407.0 445.6 33% 36% 1238.5 326.8
8 78% 1554.4 454.8 500.7 29% 32% 1339.2 381.3
9 80% 1985.1 479.4 519.7 24% 26% 1711.3 420.6
10 72% 3395.9 542.2 587.3 16% 17% 2290.5 477.6  
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the ENGH.  
Note: Household sorted by household per capita income.  
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Table 5: Housing characteristics 
               Owners                 Tenants
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Difference |z|-stat
Houses
bedrooms 3.126 1.110 2.806 0.985 0.320 4.265
phone 0.621 0.485 0.414 0.494 0.208 6.250
water 0.664 0.472 0.746 0.436 -0.081 2.543
security 0.013 0.112 0.017 0.130 -0.005 0.594
parking 0.358 0.479 0.255 0.437 0.102 3.141
hot water 0.624 0.484 0.612 0.488 0.012 0.359
e.doorbell 0.103 0.304 0.078 0.268 0.025 1.240
Apartments
bedrooms 2.985 1.064 2.296 0.905 0.689 11.138
bathrooms 1.273 0.616 1.057 0.337 0.216 6.409
heating 0.809 0.393 0.641 0.480 0.168 6.556
exc bath 0.992 0.091 0.986 0.116 0.005 0.891
floor 2 0.166 0.373 0.147 0.354 0.020 0.894
floor 3 0.135 0.342 0.120 0.325 0.016 0.764
floor 4 0.282 0.450 0.372 0.484 -0.090 3.246
floor 5 0.215 0.411 0.177 0.382 0.038 1.578
complex 0.112 0.315 0.049 0.217 0.063 3.505
stove 0.948 0.223 0.924 0.266 0.024 1.688
type bath 0.924 0.266 0.929 0.258 -0.005 0.308  
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the ENGH.  
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Table 6: Intercept estimations for conditional quantile income distribution of rent 
 
               Logs               Levels           Difference with original intercept
                pesos           percentage
Decile Houses Apart. Houses Apart. Houses Apart. Houses Apart.
1 4.62 3.43 101.64 30.86 -34.78 -46.40 -25.5% -60.1%
2 4.72 3.31 112.59 27.34 -23.82 -49.92 -17.5% -64.6%
3 4.72 4.35 112.50 77.34 -23.91 0.08 -17.5% 0.1%
4 4.86 4.44 128.57 84.38 -7.84 7.12 -5.7% 9.2%
5 4.98 4.50 145.80 90.24 9.39 12.98 6.9% 16.8%
6 5.11 4.52 165.29 91.43 28.88 14.17 21.2% 18.3%
7 5.17 4.73 176.47 113.02 40.06 35.76 29.4% 46.3%
8 5.21 4.80 183.28 121.97 46.87 44.71 34.4% 57.9%
9 5.24 4.68 188.57 108.00 52.16 30.74 38.2% 39.8%
10 5.48 4.42 240.00 83.00 103.59 5.74 75.9% 7.4%
OLS 4.92 4.35 136.41 77.26  
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the ENGH.  
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Table 7: Distributional effects of implicit rents 
             Without adjustment for under-report                  Adjusted for under-report
OLS estimations       QR estimations          OLS estimations        QR estimations
                 Impute rent to credit takers?                   Impute rent to credit takers? 
   Original yes         no yes         no yes         no yes         no
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) (viii) (ix)
Gini 0.445 0.410 0.413 0.418 0.421 0.427 0.428 0.431 0.432
Theil 0.351 0.291 0.295 0.301 0.305 0.320 0.321 0.325 0.326
CV 1.006 0.887 0.893 0.898 0.905 0.947 0.950 0.952 0.954
Atk (e=1) 0.299 0.259 0.258 0.262 0.270 0.279 0.275 0.280 0.285
Atk (e=2) 0.546 0.448 0.454 0.469 0.474 0.486 0.489 0.498 0.500
Atk (e=3) 0.794 0.597 0.605 0.624 0.629 0.650 0.652 0.667 0.668  
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the ENGH.  
Note: CV=coefficient of variation, Atk(e)=Atkinson index with inequality-aversion parameter e.  
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Graph 1: Quantile Regression estimations  
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Source: Authors’ calculations based on the ENGH.  
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Figure 2: Comparison of densities of household income  
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               Source: Authors’ calculations based on the ENGH.  
 
